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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I apply teleofunctionalism to a current debate concerning the normativity of
practical rationality. Assuming teleofunctionalism is the correct theory of mental phenomena, I
argue that it can provide a promising account of the normativity of practical rationality. This
claim is motivated by the idea that a capacity to represent internal states, external states, and
relations between these states as reasons for action has a teleofunction, and is thus a source of
normativity. This teleofunction is marked by a distinctive causal role that reason-representation
plays in action. Although I argue that this capacity developed out of processes of biological
natural selection, the content of representations of reasons for action produced by the
mechanisms underlying this capacity need not be determined solely by biological selection. In an
effort to naturalize normativity in this way, I discuss the relation between biological-functional
normativity and the normativity of rationality itself.
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1. INTRODUCTION
‘Practical rationality’ is typically described in one of two ways: 1) recognizing what I
have reason to do, or 2) internal coherence of psychological states or attitudes relative to the
practical reasons I already have. Recognizing that I have most reason to avoid harmful predators
or to eat nutritious apples over dirt are both instances of rationality in the first sense.1 Rationality
in the second sense prescribes a certain way in which we ought to think about the reasons we
have such that our other mental states are consistent with those reasons. If I believe that I have
most reason to apply for this car loan over that car loan, then rationality requires that I decide to
apply for this one. It’s easy to see how these two senses of rationality can be conceptually
separated. I may recognize what I have most reason to do, but fail to form appropriate decisions
and intentions following the recognition of what reasons there are for me. Alternatively, there
may be times when I do not recognize what I actually have most reason to do. In fact it’s
probably true of most of us that we very rarely recognize what we have most reason to do.
Nevertheless, once we have formed beliefs about what we have most reason to do, rationality
makes certain demands on us—it requires that our psychological attitudes cohere with those
beliefs. If I believe that I have most reason to donate to Oxfam, then rationality requires that I
form an intention to donate to Oxfam.
We would not want to reduce rationality to coherence of psychological states alone,
however, because such a reduction would entail that acting on the basis of false beliefs regarding
what one has reason to do would be correctly described as rational. Murdering one’s neighbor
isn’t the rational thing to do merely because one believes he has most reason to rid himself of his
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From here onward, ‘rationality’ and ‘practical rationality’ will be used interchangeably. In this paper I avoid any
direct discussion of theoretical or epistemic rationality.
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neighbor (perhaps his neighbor’s cats regularly meander into his garden and consume his basil
leaves). Hence, the normative2 standard of practical rationality includes not only internal
coherence of psychological states, but also an ability to recognize actual reasons as opposed to
merely apparent ones. Simply put, practical rationality is a capacity to respond correctly to
actual reasons.
The normative standard of practical rationality is pervasive throughout our day-to-day
interactions with others and our introspection on our own behavior. We feel normative pressure
to be rational, and our reasons take priority when we deliberate about possible courses of action
that we might take. Moreover, acting rationally often renders one the object of praise, acting
irrationally the object of criticism. There are distinct phenomenologies to serving as the object in
either case. Generally speaking, we feel good when others approve of our actions and bad when
they do not. When we fail to act in accordance with the dictates of reason we often feel guilty,
ashamed, or even blameworthy.3
It should be clear that we at least think and act as if rationality were normative, but is it
really? What licenses or entitles us to apply the normative standards of rationality to our own
behavior and the behavior of others? Nicholas Southwood claims that any account of the
normativity of rationality “would have to show that, for any agent and rational requirement, the
agent has an independent reason to obey the requirement” (13). In other words, any successful
account of the normativity of rationality must provide universal justification for complying with
rational requirements. Rationality must be normative for everyone, everywhere, all of the time.

2

There are a variety of ways in which one might use the term ‘normative’. In this paper, I will use the term to refer
to a feature of rules or requirements that renders those rules or requirements ones that we ought to follow or have
reason to follow. Practical rationality is normative in the sense that we ought to follow the rules of rationality.
3
This claim is consistent with our sometimes regretting having done what we thought was the most rational thing to
do. There is probably quite a bit of individual difference on this point. I mention these points only to highlight the
concrete nature of rationality in our everyday lives.
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The supposed categorical nature of the normativity of rationality has led some
philosophers to doubt that rationality is in fact normative. For example, John Broome argues that
“it is only a contingent fact, if it is a fact at all, that the rational faculty is part of the best means
of achieving much of what you ought to achieve” (10). Although rationality is instrumentally
successful, we can imagine possible worlds in which rationality is not the best means we have of
achieving the things that we ought to. It follows naturally from these possible worlds that the
following proposition is false: necessarily, if rationality requires N to F, then N ought to F
because rationality requires N to F.4 Hence, Broome says that no argument can be given to show
that rationality is in fact normative, although he takes it for granted that rationality is in fact
normative. One might worry that if Broome is right, then the normative claims we make about
human rationality are illegitimate. When we charge people with irrationality, our charge is
groundless. In order for rationality to be normative, the rules of rationality must necessarily
apply to all rational agents.
In this paper, I also take it for granted that rationality is in fact normative. In other words,
my goal is not to persuade the skeptic who asks “Why ought I be rational?” that she is wrong. On
the contrary, my goal is to offer a convincing answer to the question “What makes it the case that
rationality is normative for creatures like us?” To help the reader see the problem I am trying to
address, consider the following analogy. Suppose I am doing evolutionary biology and a
skeptical student approaches me and asks “Do hearts really pump blood?” I may respond to the
student that I merely take it for granted that hearts pump blood—that I don’t need to provide any
arguments to answer this or that skeptical challenge about brute biological facts. However,
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Broome refers to this proposition as strong normativity. In his 2008, he distinguishes between strong, weak, and
medium normativity. Strong normativity entails both weak and medium normativity. Hence, if I can show that
rationality is normative in the strong sense, that is all that is required to show that rationality is normative in any
sense on his reading of normativity.
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suppose another student approaches me and asks “I know that hearts pump blood, but why do
they do this?” To respond to this question, I may provide an argument for why the heart does
what it does by reference to the heart’s evolutionary history. Analogously, an interested
philosophy student might ask “I know that I ought to do the rational thing, but what makes this
true? Why is rationality normative?”
To answer these questions, I draw from the philosophies of mind and biology, both
following the lead of, and responding to a challenge from, Timothy Schroeder. In “Practical
Rationality is a Problem in the Philosophy of Mind,” Schroeder argues that philosophers of mind
have at their disposal various tools for explaining the normativity of rationality. In short, his
argument runs as follows: insofar as actions are caused by some combination of mental states,
e.g. beliefs, desires, and intentions, it’s likely that an essential feature, or combination of
features, of these states might lead us in the right direction to explaining the normativity of
rationality. Philosophers of mind are well-equipped to answer questions about these mental states
and their interactions. Thus, philosophers of mind ought to be working on giving a satisfactory
account of the normativity of rationality.
Following this initial methodological suggestion Schroeder considers the extent to which
teleofunctionalism, a substantive thesis in the philosophy of mind, can explain this kind of
normativity. Teleofunctionalism is an attractive tool for bridging the gap between is and ought
because the notion of a teleofunction provides a direct source of normativity. Consider the
teleofunction of a sunflower’s phototropic mechanisms. Those phototropic mechanisms that
succeed in turning the sunflower toward the sun are doing what they were naturally designed to
do. Defective mechanisms that fail to turn the sunflower toward the sun fail to do what they
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ought to do. Thus, the teleofunction of these mechanisms in sunflowers serves as a kind of
prescriptive norm for what the mechanisms are supposed to do.
After a brief examination of teleofunctionalism’s virtues, Schroeder concludes that the
theory fails to explain the normativity of practical rationality for two primary reasons. First,
Davidson’s Swampman5 demonstrates that histories of natural selection fail to explain the
normativity of rationality because “[e]ven if we were, like Donald Davidson, the children of an
earthly swamp and a heavenly lightning bolt, we would be capable of acting rationally or
irrationally: as we ought or as we ought not” (402). Thus, reference to histories of natural
selection fails to explain the rationality of action. However, one might respond that histories of
natural selection are required to have a mind at all. Schroeder’s second objection is that
teleofunctionalism still fails because “biological imperatives are not enough to make a course of
action truly reasonable” (402). To support this claim, Schroeder invokes the idea that we could
have “been naturally selected to sometimes have sex with biologically fit and fertile partners
regardless of the social, emotional, and moral consequences of such sex” (402). The point is that
having such sex would not be made rational simply by virtue of its having been genetically
selected for.
Perhaps Schroeder is too quick to dismiss teleofunctionalism as a philosophical tool with
which to explain rational normativity. In what follows, I’ll address Schroeder’s initial worries
about the extent to which teleofunctionalism succeeds at this task.6 After dismissing these

5

The Swampman argument is a thought experiment first put forth by Davidson in “Knowing One’s Own Mind”
(1987). Suppose Davidson is standing near a swamp when lightning strikes a tree beside him and destroys him. Also
suppose that, by some cosmic coincidence, the lightning results in the formation and emergence from the swamp of
another creature that is particle-for-particle identical to Davidson. The apparent problem for teleofunctionalism is
that there is no history of natural selection present in Davidson’s example, yet it seems that Davidson’s
doppelganger would still be minded. If this intuition is correct, histories of natural selection are not required for
either an adequate account of mental content or the normativity of practical rationality.
6
However, I’ll leave aside a detailed response to the Swampman objection. Swampman is a problem for
teleofunctionalism only if histories of natural selection are required to instantiate normative functions. Processes of
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worries, I’ll offer reasons to support the idea that teleofunctionalism can explain the normativity
of practical rationality. Specifically, a cognitive capacity to represent internal states (e.g. beliefs,
desires, preferences, goals), external states, and relations between these states, as reasons for
action is a capacity that arose out of biological selection processes during the course of human
evolutionary history. Over time, this capacity developed into a system designed to organize
competing reasons for action and be motivated by them. For example, suppose I recognize that
the delicious flavor of the chocolate cake in front of me is a reason for me to eat the cake, but I
also recognize that my desire to lose weight is a reason to avoid eating the cake. Without a
system designed to deliberate about these reasons and organize them hierarchically it’s unlikely
that I would be able to reliably act on the best reasons that there are for me. Hence, the rational
capacity is in the business of not only recognizing reasons, but also ordering them appropriately
such that my actions reflect what I have most reason to do.
If our capacity for rationality was naturally designed in this way, then the rational
capacity is normative by virtue of its serving a teleofunction—the capacity was designed to
perform a certain function, so an ought is created by natural selection. That is not to say that the
content of reason-representations is best explained solely by genetically-driven processes of
natural selection. The content of reason-representations can be derived from a variety of
selection processes whether they be biological, social, developmental, or processes of social or
ontogenetic learning. Thus, the teleofunction of the cognitive capacity for reason-representation
explains why rationality is normative, but the actual content of representations produced by the
mechanisms underlying this capacity can be filled in by whatever reasons for action there happen
natural design are sufficient to create teleofunctions, but why think that they are also necessary? Schroeder (2004)
himself offers a convincing teleofunctionalist response to the Swampman argument by invoking the notion that
normative functions can be instantiated atemporally through processes of regulation. I don’t have space to
appropriately engage with this idea here, so I’ll merely direct the reader to Schroeder’s argument in “Functions
From Regulation” (2004).
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to be for a particular agent in her particular situations, reasons which are dependent on her
environment, history, and mental and bodily states. I don’t deny that some content-specific
internal states might also have been directly selected for on the basis of serving a teleofunction in
the systems of which they are a part, but I won’t argue for such a view here.
Hence, I argue that the capacity for rationality—our ability to represent reasons and to be
motivated to act on them—is normative because it has a teleofunction. The content of our
reasons is appropriately flexible and may vary depending on the agent in question. On my
reading of the normativity of rationality, perhaps there is a sense, albeit a thin one, in which this
normativity can be known a priori. It may be true that, for any agent in any possible world, one
always ought to respond correctly to reasons. However, responding correctly to reasons might
be instantiated in a variety of different ways across possible worlds. Spelling out what the rules
of rationality actually entail in a given world is an activity that requires importing at least some
empirical content about that world. To be clear, my goal in this paper is to explain why the
rational capacity that we actually possess is one that we ought to use when we deliberate about
possible courses of action. Indeed, it is a contingent feature of our world that natural selection
has shaped a rational capacity that serves as the best means we have of responding correctly to
reasons. The mere fact that there are other possible ways in which rationality could be realized
does not entail that natural selection can’t explain why the human rational capacity is normative
for creatures like us, which is the object of focus in this paper.

2. TELEOFUNCTIONALISM, REASON-REPRESENTATION, & RATIONAL NORMS
The capacity to consider reasons for action and deliberate about what to do in order to
determine a rational course of action can be explained by processes of natural selection. Given
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the assumption that the ultimate purpose behind biological change and selection is maximizing
genetic replication, it is plausible that a capacity to recognize what sorts of considerations are
relevant to acting in certain ways rather than others, which may include but may not be limited to
what ultimately best serves one’s own self-interest, would enhance differential fitness and tend to
be selected.7 It isn’t hard to see why acting irrationally would pose a direct cost to fitness. Once a
cognitive system that represents the world is combined with a motivational system that guides
action, i.e. something akin to a belief-desire psychology, a capacity for rationality follows
naturally. A creature that either counter-rationally represents one act as better for it than another
but reliably chooses the worse of the pair or fails to represent the best act as the best one
probably won’t survive long enough to reproduce and pass on its genes. Thus, departures from a
certain minimum threshold of rationality would tend to be rapidly lethal.
Although it seems plausible that rationality serves an adaptive function in human
behavior, merely stipulating the benefits of a trait (or the costs associated with its absence) is
clearly insufficient to show that the trait in question is an adaptation. Even if it is a matter of fact
that rationality is an adaptation, figuring out what rationality was selected for presents its own
problem. The evolutionary psychology literature is thoroughly saturated with just-so stories that
fail to provide the requisite evidence to support claims about some cognitive phenomenon or
other being an adaptation. Although I take it for granted that the rational capacity is in fact an
adaptation with an identifiable teleofunction, getting clear on the kind of empirical evidence that
would be required to support this point is important.
In Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology, Robert C. Richardson offers a
skeptical, and to my mind successful, examination of evolutionary psychology’s actual
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Psychological egoism, or the idea that humans either act or are motivated to act only out of self-interest, is
compatible with, but surely not entailed by, the view I’m advocating here.
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methodology. What Richardson criticizes is the extent to which that methodology represents
strong evolutionary reasoning. In “reverse engineering” an inference is made from current
function or structure to historical cause. It is a method used to determine the particular function
for which a trait was selected. The problem, says Richardson, is that evolutionary psychologists,
such as Cosmides and Tooby, fail to provide enough evolutionary evidence to support their
claims. With respect to social reasoning, for instance, Richardson claims that Cosmides and
Tooby “move seamlessly from the idea that we have some specialized cognitive mechanisms for
social reasoning to the conclusion that the acquisition of these mechanisms depends on the prior
existence of foundational social schemata,” although they do not provide any argument for why
this inference is a strong one (2007, 25-26). The relevance of this point for the present discussion
is that identifying the apparent function of practical rationality isn’t sufficient evidence for the
idea that the rational capacity was selected for that particular function. We need to know more
about the historical environmental conditions in which the rational capacity emerged in order to
justify the claim that the rational capacity is an adaptation. Because I don’t argue directly for this
claim, the reader may wish to read my ultimate conclusion as a conditional—if the rational
capacity is an adaptation that was selected for because it has the teleofunction that I stipulate,
then practical rationality is normative.
It wouldn’t be surprising if it turned out that future evidence supported the claim that a
rational capacity that motivates actions that satisfy an agent’s own goals, preferences, and desires
was directly selected for. For ease of use, call the kind of representation formed by such a
capacity a ‘PR-representation’: a mental representation of a reason for action that expresses
normative force regarding performance of that action (i.e. an “ought” thought), the content of
which is dependent on the agent’s internal states and the relations those states have to her
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external environment. Does the PR-representational system have a teleofunction? If so, what is
this teleofunction, and what is the relation between a fully functioning PR-representational
system and the normativity of rationality?
To answer these questions, consider the teleofunction of the human heart—namely,
pumping blood. It seems that to say the heart has the specific teleofunction ‘pumping blood’ is to
do no more than to give a causal explanation for what the heart was designed to do by reference
to a selective history wherein past hearts contributed to higher overall levels of fitness in the
organisms that possessed them (Millikan 1984, 27-8). In other words, the human heart has the
teleofunction of pumping blood because that’s what the heart was selected to do. The heart was
selected to perform this function because it enhances fitness for the organism possessing the
heart. This type of function is commonly referred to in the literature as “function as selected
effect” (Wouters 2003, 649). A phenotypic trait that performs an adaptive function gets selected
for by virtue of its fitness-enhancing effect.
An analogous case can be made for the claim that the PR-representational system has a
teleofunction that developed out of processes of natural selection. This claim hinges on the
plausibility of the idea that past PR-representational systems contributed to higher overall levels
of fitness in those organisms that possessed them. To motivate this line of thought, consider a
unique way in which poisonous snakes can be cognitively represented. As with other mammals,
many humans are hard-wired to fear snakes, an adaptation that comes with clear evolutionary
advantages. Those organisms that lacked a fear of poisonous snakes were more likely to be
harmed or even killed by being bitten. Quickly and automatically avoiding snakes is an action
that isn’t best explained by action-motivating PR-representations, because reflex-like emotional
actions aren’t driven by rational calculation, deliberation, or consideration of reasons for action.
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Interestingly, however, it’s sometimes the case that we desire to approach poisonous snakes.
Suppose I want to display the physiology of a pit viper to a class of middle school students. As a
rational agent, I recognize that my desire to reach into the tank to grab the viper overrides the
more basic desire I have to avoid snakes in virtue of my wearing protective gear. Insofar as I am
rational, I recognize that acting out of an immediate fear response when I know that I’m out of
harm’s way constitutes a kind of irrational action.8 In this example, the PR-representational
system motivates action such that my basic desire to avoid snakes is overridden by a stronger
desire to be an effective instructor. Thus, the PR-representational system allows rational agents
to organize their reasons for action in light of an overall set of goals, preferences, and desires
(i.e. conflicting desires to avoid snakes and not avoid snakes) by recognizing the relations
between internal states and the external states that make certain courses of action rational (i.e.
that the snake is poisonous but I’m also wearing protective gear).
Alternatively, consider another agent, call her Morgan, who strongly desires to finish
writing her dissertation by the end of the fall semester. Morgan believes that going out drinking
with friends on Friday nights will prevent her from finishing her dissertation on time, and she
desires more to finish the dissertation than to party with her friends. It seems plausible that
having a capacity to cognitively represent ‘working on her dissertation’ as the thing she ought to
do would result in a greater probability that Morgan performs actions aimed at finishing her
dissertation on time than if she lacked the capacity to appropriately organize her PRrepresentations. Thus, the actual teleofunction of the PR-representational system is best
expressed in the following way: picking out the action for which the agent has most reason and

8

For further elaboration on this idea, see Michael Brady’s (2009) “The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions,”
Philosophical Studies 145 (3): 413-30.
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motivating the agent to perform that action. In this case, the PR-representations guiding Morgan
to write her dissertation are selected by the PR-representational system to motivate action.
Although overriding basic desires to avoid snakes and representing some actions (e.g.
writing a dissertation) as more rational than other alternatives are both exercises of the rational
capacity that also have content, my central focus here is on the bare capacity to engage in such
cognitive processes. This capacity arose out of a selective pressure to organize the reasons for
action that we were antecedently able to recognize. Offering examples that already have content
is merely a useful feature of giving a plausible account of why such a capacity would have been
selected for in the first place.
It is important to note that the kind of normativity captured by the teleofunctional strategy
is prima facie different from the kind of normativity typically implicated in discussions about
rationality. Contemporary ethicists usually describe the normativity of rationality in nonfunctional, non-biological terms. For example, Nicholas Southwood argues that rationality is
normative because of distinctive kinds of standpoint-relative demands that rationality imposes on
us. On Southwood’s view, behaving rationally is “a matter of honoring our first-personal
authority” (28). Moreover, some philosophers reject entirely the idea that the normativity of
rationality can be explained by facts about our biology or the functional role played by some
subset of our cognitive systems. Niko Kolodny argues, for instance, that the normativity of
rationality can’t be explained at all by functional or biological facts created by natural selection
because we would be subject to the standards of rationality whether or not there are any fitness
consequences attached to acting rationally or irrationally. Kolodny claims that “[i]t is an a priori
truth, if you like, that we are, as believers and intenders, subject to standards of rationality. It is
not something that evolutionary biology could confirm or disconfirm” (2005, 552).

12

On the teleofunctional account, this way of approaching normativity is mistaken. The
mere fact that the normativity of rationality seems to represent an “a priori truth” does not entail
that evolutionary biology has nothing important to say about it. It might still be the case that
these different ways of talking about the normativity of rationality, through either a naturalistic
lens or a rationalist one, are related in interesting ways. As a matter of fact, any attempt to
naturalize either reasons or rationality will have to come to terms with the relation between the
kind of normativity discussed by ethicists and the more primitive kinds issued by the natural
sciences. Most of the motivation behind this project is a desire to explain how it could be the
case that the kind of normativity involved in discussions of rationality is derivative on the kind of
normativity inferred from more basic facts about the biological functions of our bodily systems.
On my view, it may be an a priori truth that all agents ought to respond correctly to reasons. We
don’t need evolutionary biology to tell us that. However, evolutionary biology does tell us what
“responding correctly to reasons” actually amounts to for creatures like us in a world like ours.
To explain how these two kinds of normativity are related, it seems reasonable to begin
with the idea that the normativity of the PR-representational system is best cashed out in terms of
the conditions for success and those for failure of this system’s teleofunction. The PRrepresentational system succeeds in performing its teleofunction when the process by which it
selects PR-representations with which to motivate action tracks, or lines up with, the norms of
rationality. In other words, the teleofunction of the PR-representation system is to produce
intentions and decisions that align with what is practically rational for the agent in question. For
example, an agent may sometimes have PR-representations that fail to capture the salient
features of her environment that afford genuine reasons for action, and thereby guide action
toward ends that go against what is rational for her to do. When the PR-representational system
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selects these representations as reasons on which to base action, the system fails to perform its
teleofunction. Thus, the conditions for success and failure regarding the proper functioning of the
PR-representational system captures a sense of normativity in that it prescribes what one ought
to do. At a most basic level, the sense in which I ought to be rational is the same as the sense in
which anything ought to comply with its teleofunction. I ought to be rational in the same sense
that my heart ought to continue pumping blood. This is the sense in which biological-functional
normativity and the normativity of rationality shake hands. Hence, the way to respond correctly
to reasons is to comply with the output of one’s own PR-representational system. In Sections 3
and 4 I will describe how these kinds of normativity are different, but not so different that the
latter can’t be derived from the former.

2.1

Non-Genetically Driven Teleofunctions & PR-Representational Content
It should be clear that I am not claiming that the normativity of rationality is completely

explained by genetically-driven processes of natural selection. Teleofunctionalism, including
Millikan’s elaborate proper functionalism (1984), is not intrinsically linked with biological
natural selection, and selection processes can apply to many different types of systems (e.g.
social, cultural, developmental, learning). Schroeder’s point that “biological imperatives are not
enough to make a course of action truly reasonable” (402) hardly discounts all attempts to
ground the normativity of practical rationality in teleofunctions. Although it’s true that some
practically irrational behaviors could have been selected for—for example, Schroeder’s example
about having sex regardless of the social, emotional, or moral consequences9—nothing I have

9

Although I might add that it is hard to see how there wouldn’t be fitness consequences stemming from
indiscriminate sex. Ignoring real features of the world doesn’t change the fact that those features will have
consequences, many of which may decrease overall fitness. For example, suppose I decide to have sex with Mike
Tyson’s wife, all the while ignoring the social consequences of doing so, and then he finds out about it.

14

said above is incompatible with the notion that the content of PR-representations can be and
oftentimes is determined by non-biological selection processes because teleofunctionalism
makes no essential reference to biological natural selection.10 Teleofunctions can arise out of
processes of natural selection (e.g. the teleofunction of the rational capacity), but it’s not
necessary that they do. Although a capacity to consider reasons for action and deliberate about
what to do arose out of biological selection processes, there is no reason to believe that the
content of the PR-representations produced by such a capacity is wholly determined by
immediate facts about our biology, with complete disregard for say, social or moral facts.
In fact, the content of many PR-representations is derived from non-genetically driven
selection processes and non-selectional processes like social learning. First, selection processes
can occur at an ontogenetic level, from “the differential reproduction of cognitive or behavioural
items themselves during the development of a given individual” (Macdonald & Papineau 2006,
15). Such ontogenetic selection sometimes results in content derived “not from the evolution of
the species, but from the development of the individual” (Dretske 1988, 64). For an example of
PR-representational content derived from this kind of selection process, consider the actions
performed by skilled poker players. After reading countless guides and playing in a bunch of
tournaments, Gabe learns that raising his opponent’s ante while holding a pair of aces is in his
best interest. He raises the ante because he recognizes that raising is the rational thing to do,
which he learned through past experience. There is no good reason to believe that the contentspecific PR-representation guiding the decision to raise an opponent in poker would have been
genetically selected for, yet the content is still appropriate for filling in a PR-representation.
Thus, processes of learning and the development of skills or talents can provide content for PRrepresentations.
10

Abrams (2005) presents a nice discussion of the relation between natural selection and teleofunctionalism.
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Second, selection processes to perform actions that conform to social norms are also a
source from which the content of PR-representations is derived. Fidelity to one’s spouse, for
instance, is required by the extant social norms in the U.S. and many other countries. The
selective processes responsible for these norms are probably social in kind.11 It isn’t uncommon
for an individual to cheat on her spouse even when she knows this is something she should not
do. Cheating on one’s spouse, therefore, is oftentimes appropriately described as a form of
akratic behavior, or an irrational action. A description of the reasons why one shouldn’t cheat on
her spouse will include reference to the obligations and commitments one has agreed to endorse,
which are best explained by social selection processes. Thus, we evolved the cognitive capacity
to take social conventions as normative, and the actual content of any particular social
convention is determined most immediately by social selection processes themselves.
Finally, PR-representations can be filled in by moral content. Recognition that another
human being is a fully autonomous agent, for instance, might provide a reason in favor of taking
her interests seriously. Another creature’s capacity for sentience might also provide a reason for
acting towards it in certain ways rather than others, e.g. acting so as to avoid harming it.
Teleofunctionalism might not give us a satisfactory account of the salient features of states of
affairs that represent moral properties. What it can do, however, is give an account of why one
ought to comply with the output of her systems of rationality, when that output consists of PRrepresentations whose content was determined by actual moral properties, whatever those
properties happen to be. As I stated earlier, it might turn out that there are content-specific
internal states, in this case ones that track actual moral properties that were directly selected for
because they serve a particular teleofunction. However, I don’t argue for such a view here.

11

Such a view is compatible with the idea that monogamy might also have fitness advantages. I should also mention
that I don’t deny that this example probably represents a moral norm as well as a social one.
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2.2

PR-Representations & Rational Action
Having briefly discussed the content of PR-representational states, I’ll now relate what

has been said above about PR-representations back to the role these representational states play
in rational action. Generally speaking, it seems that any adequate explanation of the normativity
of rationality will require essential reference to something in the nature of action itself. If the
source of the normativity of practical rationality is a motivational force designed to get us to do
something, then PR-representations must play a significant role in action (at least if the system
that produces them is going to have any normative force). Thus, a psychological marker of
rational actions is that they are caused in the normal way by a fully-functioning PRrepresentational system (i.e. a system which picks out the appropriate PR-representations with
which to motivate action). The causal relation implicated here is both necessary and sufficient.
We don’t say of organisms that lack a capacity for recognizing reasons that they ought to be
rational; reason-representation is required for rationality. Hence, PR-representations are a
necessary condition for the mere possibility of instantiating rationality through the performance
of rational actions. Moreover, PR-representations are sufficient causes of rational action when
they are produced by fully-functioning systems of rationality. On this view, we can understand
akrasia in terms of cognitive systems of rationality that are defective, broken, or not performing
their teleofunction. Thus, the regulation or design of action is part of the essential nature of the
PR-representational system.
Furthermore, the notion of a PR-representation offers an interesting way to think about
the relation between judgments about rationality and action itself. There have been a few
attempts in the philosophical literature to apply teleofunctionalism to explanations of judgments
about action. For example, Neil Sinclair argues that the teleofunction of moral judgments in
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action is “steering patterns of cooperation away from the action condemned... towards the action
praised” (2012, 652).12 Whereas Sinclair uses teleofunctionalism to explain the function of moral
judgments in action, I argue for the teleofunctional role of judgments about rationality in action.
On the teleofunctional account, judgments about the rationality of action are just sets of PRrepresentations (i.e. these judgments are just aggregates of the motivating beliefs and desires that
we have with respect to action). For example, when an agent’s PR-representational system
selects certain PR-representations in favor of performing or refraining from a certain action, that
set of PR-representations constitutes the judgment the agent makes about the rationality or
irrationality of the action in question. Thus, making the judgment ‘this action is the rational thing
to do’ is nothing over and above the PR-representational system’s activity of identifying which
PR-representations win out.
Upon making a judgment that a particular action is the rational thing to do, one typically
forms an intention or decision to perform that action. However, agents don’t always do what they
believe they have most reason to do. When the agent in question fails to execute the action she
believes is represented by the best reasons, we often say of her that she performs an irrational
action. Hence, the PR-representational system can fail to serve its teleofunction at the level of
judgment or at the level of action. At the level of judgment, the system might fail to pick out the
right PR-representations with which to motivate action. Furthermore, even when the right PRrepresentations are picked out, the system may fail to actualize the right intentions and decisions.
If an agent is caused to act on the basis of her fully-functioning PR-representational system, then
she acts rationally. Furthermore, if an agent acts rationally, then she must have represented actual
reasons at the level of judging possible courses of action and formed intentions and decisions
that are responsive to those reasons. This line of thought provides support for the idea that a fully
12

Also, see Harms (2000) for a teleofunctionalist account of moral statements and utterances in action.
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functioning PR-representational system is both causally necessary and sufficient for rational
action, assuming there are no external circumstances that inhibit an intentional action from being
realized.

3. REASONS OBJECTIVITY
In Section 2, I argued that the PR-representational system can fail to serve its
teleofunction at two levels: 1) at the level of judgment, and 2) at the level of action. Up to this
point I have emphasized the role of PR-representations in rational action and the sense in which
the teleofunction of the PR-representational system can explain how rationality is normative.
Using PR-representations to explain these phenomena perhaps gives the impression that I am
advancing a view of reasons for action that is completely subjective. Such an impression is
misleading. I will now argue that the teleofunctional account of practical rationality does not
necessarily rule out the objectivity of rational action.
At the level of judgment, I’ll assume there is an independent normative order that
determines the successful representation of a reason for action. Such a normative order is
required in order to keep the present account from sliding into complete subjectivity regarding
what counts as rational action. Without an objective standard, what is rational for me to do is
simply whatever my systems of rationality would have me do. Completely subjective theories of
rationality like this fail to take into account the normativity involved not only in responding
correctly to reasons, but in correctly representing actual reasons for action as such. An alcoholic
who represents his desire for booze as an overriding reason in every case where drinking is one
of his possible courses of action is behaving irrationally if drinking is causing him all sorts of
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problems in his health or personal life such that he would be better off without it.13 Although he
represents drinking as ‘that which I have most reason to do’, acting in accord with that
representation isn’t sufficient for rational action because he gets things wrong at the level of
rational judgment. Avoiding the drink entirely would be more conducive to his flourishing.
Examples like this suggest that there are better and worse ways to organize one’s internal states
as reasons, given one’s specific situation. On the teleofunctional account of practical rationality,
one ought to go about organizing her internal states such that there is output of intentions and
decisions that actually satisfy or help to satisfy the agent’s goals, preferences, and desires.
Just as some people are better than others at organizing their own internal states such that
they succeed in performing rational actions, it’s also true that some people are better than others
at recognizing what the external reasons are in favor of doing this rather than that. The fact that
the cheeseburger sitting in front of you contains E. coli is certainly a reason for you to avoid
eating the cheeseburger, yet it would seem too stringent to require that creatures like us have the
ability to detect such a reason in order to be rational. It also seems true that hypothetical
creatures that were better at detecting this reason, as well as all the ones we appropriately detect,
would possess better systems of rationality, i.e. they would be more rational than us. Thus,
veridical ascriptions of rationality fall somewhere on a continuum. There are greater and lesser
degrees of it present in any particular agent, depending on the kinds of things the agent
represents as reasons as well as the level of internal psychological coherence that follows from
those representations. That isn’t to say that we should fault the rational capacity of humans for
not being able to detect microorganisms in food or failing to always recognize all of the actual
reasons (although rationality would still minimally require the representation of at least some
actual reasons). It seems reasonable to apply to any theory of the normativity of rationality what
13

Indeed, not all (perhaps even not many) alcoholics represent drinking in this way.
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Owen Flanagan calls the Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism: “[m]ake sure when
constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision processing
and behavior prescribed are possible, or perceived to be possible, for creatures like us” (32).
Although Flanagan’s principle applies to moral theory, it is easily adapted to theories about
rationality. An application of this principle to the teleofunctional account of rationality allows us
to talk about what sorts of things humans ought to be able to recognize as reasons without
making unreasonable demands on human behavior.
This notion of actual as opposed to merely apparent reasons makes the teleofunctional
account of rationality an objectively reasonable approach. In addition to certain objective facts
about me that in part determine the rationality of my actions (e.g. it is a fact about me that I have
certain goals, preferences, and desires), there are also objective facts outside of me that
determine the rationality of my actions. PR-representations are causally related to the organism’s
environment through interactions with input stimuli afforded by the environment. For example,
the fact that the pit viper in the tank is poisonous explains why a PR-representation was formed
to guide action toward grabbing this snake rather than one of the other non-poisonous snakes in
the tank (again, because I want to show the middle-schoolers what the poisonous snake looks
like). Thus, there is something about the world that makes it the case that some features of
external states of affairs get represented normatively as reasons for action and others do not. In
order for the PR-representational system to succeed in actualizing its teleofunction, it must
reliably indicate the salient features of a particular external state of affairs that make a course of
action rational, representing those features as reasons for action. Although the actual content of
any particular PR-representation is relative to the goals, preferences, and desires of the agent in
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question, there is no reason to think that this fact alone entails an entirely subjective account of
reasons for action.
At the level of action, there are also objective standards that determine what counts as
rational action. It is an objective fact about me whether or not I decide to act on the basis of what
I have reason to do. Deciding to act in accordance with, or forming intentions that are responsive
to, one’s own PR-representations is required for rational action. Although there are things
outside of my control that may inhibit my ability to actualize the action that I have most reason
to perform (perhaps working on my dissertation is the rational thing for me to do today, but I get
into a car accident on the way to the library), such external factors do not by themselves
constrain my ability to behave rationally. Suppose that the agent in question who has
successfully represented actual reasons for action decides to act on the basis of what she has
most reason to do. The mere fact that something about the world makes it the case that she can
no longer perform that action does not thereby make her irrational because it prevents her from
executing the action that she has most reason to perform. Systems of rationality that output
intentions and decisions that are responsive to actual reasons for action are fully-functioning, full
stop.
These points about the objectivity of rationality, both at the level of judgment and at the
level of action, are instructive. Perhaps most important is that the normativity of rationality
requires that certain features of the world actually obtain. In order for rationality to be genuinely
normative, facts about rationality must be intimately tied to facts about the causal texture of the
world in which the agent is acting. As Broome notes, we can imagine worlds in which our
rational requirements are not the best means of achieving the things one ought to achieve due to
a fundamental disconnect between our rational requirements and the causal order:
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I assume it is only a contingent fact, if it is a fact at all, that the rational faculty is part of
the best means of achieving much of what you ought to achieve. I assume there could be quirky
worlds where that is not so. In a quirky world, people with the rational faculty generally satisfy
the same requirements of rationality as people do in our world. They generally intend to do the
things they believe they ought to do; they generally do not have contradictory beliefs; they
generally believe what follows by modus ponens from things they believe; and so on. But
because of the way causal processes work in their world, satisfying the requirements of
rationality tends to be unsuccessful. These people tend not to end up having the beliefs they
ought to have, doing the things they ought to do, and so on. They do not achieve much of what
they ought to achieve.
In a quirky world there are also people who do not have the rational faculty. Those
people do just what they feel like doing, believe whatever comes into their heads, and so on. The
causal processes in their world bring it about that these people achieve much of what they ought
to achieve.
Plausibly, it is not the case that people in a quirky world ought to have the rational
faculty, since it is not a means of achieving much of what they ought to achieve. This suggests
that, if the rational faculty were not instrumentally successful, it would not be the case that we
ought to have it. So it supports the claim that, if we ought to have the rational faculty, that is
because it is instrumentally successful (10-11).
Although I think Broome’s ultimate conclusion that no argument can be given to show that
rationality is in fact normative is mistaken, there is something instructive to be learned from his
thought experiment. Before discussing its virtue, however, I want to highlight two of its
problems. The first problem is that it isn’t clear how Broome’s quirky worlds are supposed to
defeat the idea that rationality is normative for creatures like us. Indeed, if the causal processes
in Sarah’s world bring it about that her immediate feelings and beliefs always guide action such
that she does what she ought to do, then she has no need for a practically rational faculty at all, at
least not in the sense that she needs to rationally calculate reasons in her world. That
counterfactual point doesn’t show that creatures in our world have no need for a practically
rational faculty and in fact ought to use it if they have it. The second problem is that it also isn’t
clear that the people who do not have the capacity to calculate reasons in a quirky world aren’t
still responding correctly to the actual reasons in their world and are thereby behaving rationally,
as they ought. In Sarah’s world, when she feels like doing something, that fact is a reason for her
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to do it. When some practical belief pops into her head, that is a reason for her to believe it. So,
although Sarah might not rationally calculate the actual reasons in her world, it doesn’t follow
that she is not responding correctly to actual reasons. In this sense, it may still be correct to say
that Sarah is behaving rationally, and she ought to be doing so.14 Hence, Broome’s thought
experiment does not undermine the following claims: 1) the rational capacity that we actually
possess is something we ought to use, and 2) rationality as such is not normative.
What Broome’s thought experiment does successfully show is that the causal processes in
one’s world will determine what correctly responding to reasons amounts to. Different properties
might have different powers in different possible worlds, depending on the kinds of causal
relations in the world under investigation. In our world, causal processes must make it the case
that aligning one’s behavior with rational requirements, e.g. intending to do the things one ought
to do, normally results in success, in our actually doing the things we ought to do. Otherwise, it
is hard to see how what we typically see as rational requirements are the right requirements at all.
Simply put, the most general conception of the normativity of practical rationality that
seems to hold necessarily across all possible worlds is that an agent ought to respond correctly to
her actual reasons. If that is all that rationality requires of any agent in any possible world, then it
is an a priori truth. The term ‘rational requirements’ specifies the correct way to respond to
reasons, which may be distinct across possible worlds. The rational requirements in the actual
world specify, for instance, that we must form intentions and decisions that align with the actual
reasons that we cognitively represent. Although the rational requirements for Sarah are different,
rationality is still normative. Rationality merely requires that she respond correctly to the actual
reasons that she represents. As far as I know (perhaps my knowledge is too limited) no

14

Assuming, that is, that Sarah and her quirky world comrades have reason-representations. If they don’t, then it’s
not clear how they would even be candidates for being constrained by the normativity of rationality.
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philosopher has stressed this intimate relation between the normativity of rational requirements
and the causal order present in one’s world. In our world, the normativity of rational
requirements presupposes a particular theory of action explanation whereby rational actions are
normally caused by things like intentions and decisions to do what one represents as rational.15
Without this specific kind of action theory we would be mistaken about our rational
requirements.
The selection processes responsible for determining the normativity of rationality play
specific causal roles in the world too. If the rational capacity is an adaptation, which I assume it
is, then it must be true that this capacity was shaped and molded by natural selection because it
played a key causal role in enhancing fitness. The teleofunctional account of rationality
presupposes that certain causal relations between the effects of natural selection and the world
actually obtain. For example, one effect of natural selection is that we have digestive systems
responsible for breaking down and absorbing nutrients. If the behavior of our digestive systems
didn’t play a key causal role in the reproduction of our genetic material, then it’s hard to see how
our digestive systems have a teleofunction, and thus a normative standard for their behavior at
all. Analogously, systems of rationality must play a key causal role in genetic reproduction for
there to be a selection-derived normative standard that constrains their behavior. In quirky
worlds with different causal powers, it’s likely that always acting on the basis of one’s
immediate beliefs and inclinations would have clear selective advantages. The effects of
selection would be different in this world, yet there would still be a teleofunction attached to the
capacity for responding correctly to reasons.

15

If these theories of action explanation turn out to be false, which they may, then the teleofunctional account of
rationality is surely doomed.
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Selection processes that determine PR-representational content must also have particular
causal relations to us and the world. For example, one effect of social selection processes is that I
have a reason to cooperate with others. If it weren’t also true of the world that cooperating with
others tended to cause the satisfaction of my own goals, preferences, and desires, then it is hard
to see how cooperation could ever be a reason for me to do one thing rather than another.16 We
realize at a very young age that failing to cooperate with others typically has negative effects on
our well-being: our parents punish us, others resent us, we lose our friends.
Steve Sloman’s work on causal models as mediators of human reasoning systems
(mediators between information in the world and our own decision-making processes) gives
strong empirical support for the kind of view I’m advocating here. If systems of rationality have
the teleofunction of signaling those features of the environment that are relevant to the pursuit of
our goals, preferences, and desires and causing certain decisions and intentions to act, then
empirical confirmation that this is the way human reasoning systems actually operate provides
initial support for my teleofunctional claim about rationality. Sloman (2005)17 writes, “we search
for the aspects or variables in the world that reliably signal information useful for achieving our
goals...[t]he most valuable information you can have to achieve your goals is knowledge about
the mechanisms that produce change. This is what causal models represent” (177). I find
Sloman’s claims here instructive because they highlight the relation between the information we
search for (external states) to help us achieve our goals (internal states) and the causal features of
the world that make this information apparent to us. An interesting feature of this sort of view is
that the means by which our systems of rationality function mirrors the relation between what we
16

The reader might be wondering whether content-creating processes like social selection are ultimately based on
natural selection, in which case the only content that could ever serve as a reason for anyone must be ultimately
directed at genetic reproduction. Perhaps this is true, although it is a very strong claim.
17
This book includes a rich assortment of studies that suggest causal modeling is the primary means by which our
rational capacities function.
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represent as reasons and the world itself. This isomorphism between the causal structure of
reason-representation and events in the world makes the rational capacity possible in the first
place. If there were no reliable regularities between things we take to be reasons and the effects
of our behavior, then it would be difficult to see how the rational capacity would have any
opportunity whatsoever to evolve. For example, if foul-smelling substances didn’t reliably cause
illness after being ingested, then it’s unreasonable to think a nasty smell could have ever become
a reason to avoid eating something. This example could be multiplied indefinitely to cover
anything that we typically take to be a reason for doing or not doing something. The rational
capacity would be completely devoid of content, in which case it would be utterly useless.

3.1

Teleofunctions as Reasons
Following a discussion of the objectivity of reasons, I want now to examine closely the

idea that teleofunctions themselves are reasons for behaving one way over another. Recall
Southwood’s rational requirement-requirement from earlier on in this paper: any account of the
normativity of rationality “would have to show that, for any agent and rational requirement, the
agent has an independent reason to obey the requirement” (13). The teleofunctional account of
practical rationality responds to this requirement by supplying the teleofunction of practical
rationality itself as an independent reason to obey rational requirements. This claim hinges on the
plausibility of the earlier claim that systems of rationality were selected for because they serve
the function of getting us do those things that help to satisfy our goals, preferences, and desires.
If it turns out that research in evolutionary psychology bolsters the idea that this is the actual
teleofunction of our rational faculties, then that teleofunctional fact provides an independent
reason to behave rationally.
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Suppose it turned out that the rational faculty was selected for because it served some
function other than the one I stipulate. Assume that this other function is one that we wouldn’t
say is good—perhaps it turns out that the rational faculty is a completely selfish calculator for the
blind satisfaction of desires. We might then say that the teleofunction of the rational faculty is
something we ought to reject as an independent reason to behave rationally. We don’t value the
blind satisfaction of desires, so we also wouldn’t value a system whose function was to blindly
satisfy desires. If we were to discover that the rational faculty was selected for this purpose, then
we wouldn’t be so inclined to say that the normativity of rationality is explained by the
teleofunction of rational systems, because rationality often requires us to do things that go
against self-interest (e.g. when PR-representations get their content from social or moral norms)
and we usually think that is a good thing. It is hard for us to imagine how rationality would be
normative if this were the rational capacity’s actual function because we are implicitly assuming
that the causal powers in both the actual world and this imaginary world are the same. If what
I’ve argued for in Section 3 is true, then it is hard to see how this counterfactually-described
rational capacity would have ever evolved in the actual world in the first place, given the actual
causal processes at work in our world. It’s unlikely that a rational faculty that functioned to
blindly satisfy desires would be without fitness consequences. Historical environmental
conditions in the actual world created selective pressures for such phenomena as social cohesion
and cooperation, which were selected for because they enhanced fitness. However, if the causal
order in one’s world make it the case that always acting for the sake of the blind satisfaction of
desires causes one to do only those things that she ought to do (presumably, those things that
contribute to human flourishing), then it’s totally plausible that a capacity facilitating such action
would have a teleofunction and thus provide an independent reason for behaving rationally.
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It isn’t at all obvious that a teleofunction can provide a reason for doing one thing rather
than another. It sounds strange to say that the heart has a reason to pump blood, unless of course
what we mean by ‘reason’ is something akin to ‘causal-historical explanation’. The relevant
difference between humans and hearts or sunflowers in terms of the normative standards that
constrain their separate behaviors is that humans have a capacity to become aware of the
functional capacities served by their individual parts, and we can recognize that allowing those
capacities to serve their teleofunctions is always in our best interest. Given such a capacity to
recognize functions as normative standards, it makes sense to talk about a teleofunction
providing a reason to do this over that, where ‘reason for X’ now means ‘a consideration in favor
of doing X’. Thus, the idea that a teleofunction can serve as an independent reason to obey
rational requirements is made possible by our capacities to become aware of, and reflect on,
reasons and normativity. The fact that we are conscious of things like reasons, functions, and
normativity (more importantly, that we can recognize the function of our rational capacity)
imposes a stronger normative constraint on our behavior than the mere success-failure conditions
that attach a level of normativity to the notion of a biological teleofunction. That is not to say
that the normative constraints afforded by rationality aren’t still derived from the teleofunction of
practical rationality itself.
Admittedly, there is quite a bit of work that needs to be done to explain this important
sense in which normativity for creatures like us is different from normativity for non-humans.
Perhaps there is something more basic than a conscious capacity to recognize reasons that makes
it the case that the normativity of rationality is different from other kinds of functional
normativity. One plausible candidate here is the notion of a persons-level mechanism: a
mechanism in whose functioning and operation I am in some meaningful sense present
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throughout. It’s likely that the rational capacity falls under the scope of things that represent
persons-level mechanisms. When I consider reasons for action, I am present throughout the
process, throughout the operation of calculating reasons for doing this over that and coming to
some conclusion regarding what I have reason to do. The contrast class to a persons-level
mechanism is a system-levels mechanism: a mechanism in whose functions and operations I am
never present. My visual system, for instance, carries out a number of complex operations to
assess and represent objects in my visual field. I enter the scene only when the finished product
of my visual system outputs some visual representation. I am neither in control of nor aware of
the functions and operations of the many subsystems that give rise to my visual representations.
The same can’t be said for the rational faculty. The distinction between persons-level
mechanisms and systems-level mechanisms is significant for getting clear on how the kind of
normativity involved in rationality is distinct, yet still derived, from more basic forms of
normativity. I suspect that a more fully developed philosophical analysis of this distinction will
require a more complete understanding of both consciousness and personal identity.
Regardless of whatever it is that gives rise to differences in kinds of normativity,
normative facts about many kinds of animal or plant behavior (which, of course, includes human
behavior) often stem from functions shaped by evolutionary biology. In the cases of the flower
that doesn’t turn toward the sun vs. the man who acts irrationally, the higher-level kind of
normativity (e.g. the normativity of rationality) is grounded in the same kind of fact, a fact about
an adaptive function shaped by natural selection, that grounds the lower-level kind of
normativity (e.g. the normativity of phototropism). In this section, I have made a case for the
idea that teleofunctions are themselves reasons that provide objective standards for behaving in
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certain ways rather than others. Might a similar case be made for other kinds of normativity like
epistemic, logical, or moral normativity? That remains to be seen.

4. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS & RESPONSES
In this thesis, I have argued that rationality is normative in virtue of the teleofunction that
the rational capacity serves in human behavior. I will now consider two objections to my
argument and respond to them.

Objection 1: Patterns of differential responses (some sunflowers turn toward the sun, others turn
away, some don’t move at all) that are conducive to fitness get selected for, but it seems more
appropriate to describe deviations from statistically normal patterns as anomalous rather than
mistaken or incorrect. The sunflower that doesn’t turn toward the sun is behaving oddly, but is it
doing something incorrectly? Indeed, phototropic mechanisms in sunflowers were probably
selected for because they enhance the fitness of sunflowers, but does a limp sunflower really
represent an instance of normative failure? To consider the objection from another angle: let's
say the "design" of sunflowers can be formulated as a set of rules or directions that sunflowers
follow when they are functioning properly. If enough sunflowers deviate from this set of rules,
we'll reconsider the rule we think sunflowers are following. We'll suspect that we got the rules
wrong. Is this how we would respond to a significant number of infractions of or deviations from
rules about how to behave rationally?18

Response to Objection 1: If enough sunflowers fail to perform what we think is the naturally
designed or adaptive function of some subset of their internal mechanisms, then of course we’ll
18

Many thanks to Eric Wilson for raising this objection.
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reconsider what we thought was the teleofunction of these mechanisms. If this situation were to
arise, it would pose an epistemic problem regarding our knowledge of what the particular
teleofunction happens to be (we wouldn’t respond similarly to deviations from rules about how
to behave rationally because we’re more confident about our knowledge of what the rules are).
However, if it’s genuinely true that the sunflower’s phototropic mechanisms have the
teleofunction of turning the flower toward the sun, then even if a bunch of sunflowers fail in this
regard, the normative standard for these mechanisms is the same. Many of them are just doing a
bad job.
Suppose, however, that the force behind this objection isn’t really epistemological at all.
That is, a rule of rationality isn’t a genuine norm of rationality if the rule should be changed in
light of failures to comply with the rule, irrespective of any epistemic awareness of these rules.
To this reading of the objection, I am largely in agreement. However, I do not think that it poses
a strong objection to any of my central claims in this thesis. Teleofunctions may change
depending on how the force of natural selection shapes the biological structure and function of
organic systems over time. However, natural selection alone can change the rules that it designs.
Failures to comply with a rule would only have an effect on what the rule actually is if it is also
the case that failing to comply with the rule represents a behavior that enhances fitness and gets
selected for. Mere failure to comply with the rule, in this case a teleofunction, is not sufficient to
change what the rule requires.
Perhaps what is really driving the intuition that these divergent cases involve distinct
kinds of behavioral assessment is that there is a relevant difference in the objects to which the
rules or normative standards apply rather than some feature of the normative standards
themselves. If we just focus on humans, for instance, one difference between the normativity
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involved in the behavior of humans vs. plants is that we tend to think that we are accountable for
our actions, and deserve praise or blame for obeying or breaching rational requirements, while
plants and other inanimate objects are not so accountable or deserving in this way. I have already
argued earlier for what I think is the central distinguishing feature that marks these distinct kinds
of normativity. In any case, ascribing functions to non-human objects (both living things and
artifacts) happens all the time and always carries with it a degree of normativity. When my fan
quits working properly, I’m entitled to say that it’s not doing what it was designed to do, what it
ought to do. The same can be said for cars, guitars, sunflowers, and humans.19

Objection 2: The kind of normativity involved in discussions about the rationality of action is
evaluative rather than prescriptive. Although the notion of a teleofunction provides a sense in
which a thing ought to behave in certain ways rather than others, teleofunctionalism alone can’t
help distinguish between those teleofunctions that we value as good (e.g. rationality) and those
that we do not (e.g. morning sickness in expectant mothers). For example, some evolutionary
biologists argue that morning sickness is an adaptation that probably served the function of
protecting a mother and her developing embryo from potentially harmful or lethal
microorganisms in food (see Profet 1992 and Alcock 2001). Their intuition is that it is likely that
morning sickness was selected for because those mothers in our ancestral history that
experienced morning sickness were more fit for their environments than those mothers that did
not. Hence, morning sickness was selected for because it performed an adaptive function in our
ancestral history, yet we don’t recognize that teleofunction as good, as something that we value.

19

The objector might be worrying that in order for function ascriptions to be licensed ones, intentional design is
required. Natural selection is a non-intentional process, so living things and their parts, unlike artifacts, don’t really
have functions at all. I refer the reader to Hannah Ginsborg’s discussion of non-intentionally designed functions and
primitive normativity in “Oughts without intentions: a Kantian approach to biological functions” (forthcoming).
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On the contrary, the kind of normativity involved in practical rationality does include our stamp
of approval. We typically say that acting rationally is what we ought to do, and doing so is a
good thing. On the teleofunctional approach to the normativity of rationality, how does one get
from a trait’s being selected for, to a teleofunction that represents something we value?

Response to Objection 2: Nothing that has been said thus far precludes the notion that there are
particular teleofunctions that we normally judge as good and others that we do not judge in this
way. There are an indefinitely large number of biological systems in the world that perform
teleofunctions that most of us wouldn’t say represent goodness in any sense (e.g. the marvelously
precise sting of parasitoid wasps on their innocent cockroach victims). Discussing this distinction
is important for discerning between the kinds of normative assessment involved in discussions
about rationality and discussions about function-oughts more generally, and explaining the
relation between the two. Whether or not we value any particular teleofunction hinges on the
kind of teleofunction in question. Those teleofunctions that serve the interests, desires,
preferences, and goals of the moral patients and agents in whatever moral theory one adopts will
be seen as good. We judge the rational capacity as good in virtue of its instrumental success in
facilitating our ability to realize those things that we value (e.g. pleasure, virtue, friendship).
Hence, the capacities PR-representations provide us are good (in every sense of the word), while
the goodness or badness of the content that fills in the exercises of our rational capacities is
variable. In any case, distinguishing between teleofunctions that we see as good and those that
we do not does not entail that there are some teleofunctions that fail to provide a normative
standard for the behavior of the systems in which they were selected (which would cause all sorts
of problems for the account I’ve sketched above). The parasitoid wasp’s sting serves an adaptive
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function in the life of the wasp and thus prescribes what the wasp ought to do when it approaches
its cockroach victim. The mere fact that we don’t say the sting is a good thing is irrelevant.
These considerations notwithstanding, it’s not entirely clear that morning sickness is an
adaptation anyway, in which case it no longer serves the teleofunction for which it was selected.
It’s likely that morning sickness was selected for in our ancestral history and use to serve a
specific teleofunction in human behavior. However, to be considered an adaptation, a trait must
continue to serve the function for which it was shaped by natural selection such that the trait is
still beneficial today (Sober 1984). It’s plausible that the value of morning sickness has been
eclipsed by pharmaceutical advances and more sophisticated technologies in the food industry. If
this much is true, not only should we abstain from positively evaluating morning sickness as
good for expectant mothers, but we shouldn’t ascribe any level of normativity to morning
sickness at all (e.g. we shouldn’t say that expectant mothers ought to get morning sickness). In
light of these considerations, morning sickness might no longer serve the teleofunction for which
it was selected in our ancestral history, which isn’t at all surprising. Teleofunctions come and go.
We should expect that the level of change in what counts as a teleofunction covaries with the
level of change in an organism’s environmental conditions. Rapidly accelerating changes in
current environmental conditions will probably continue to render many teleofunctions obsolete.
But maybe morning sickness really does still serve some adaptive function in human
behavior. If it does, then morning sickness does indeed represent something that expectant
mothers ought to undergo. If it really is an adaptation, then it is indeed a positive thing for
expectant mothers—just not a pleasant one. In either case, whether it represents an actual
adaptation or not, morning sickness does not present a viable objection to the teleofunctional
account of rationality.
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Perhaps a more apparently problematic counterexample is the reproductive system of
anyone who fails to use it solely for the sake of reproduction. It might seem like the
teleofunctional account of rationality is committed to the idea that homosexuals ought to have
heterosexual sex aimed at reproduction and heterosexual couples using contraceptives ought to
ditch their birth control because any deviation from reproduction-driven intercourse is a kind of
teleofunctional failure of our reproductive systems. Surely we wouldn’t want to say that anyone
is entitled to make such individuals the objects of criticism simply for their having failed to
comply with the teleofunctions of their reproductive organs.
Fortunately the teleofunctional account of rationality is not committed to such a
problematic view. On the teleofunctional account, we might say that there is normative failure at
the level of Jay’s reproductive system when it doesn’t produce any viable offspring. However,
that failure is a fact, not about Jay, but about merely part of Jay’s body. However, when Jay
knows that he has most reason to avoid drinking the entire bottle of bourbon but decides to
anyway (to keep things simple, assume Jay is not an alcoholic), that failure of Jay’s rational
capacities is a fact about Jay the person and thus makes him a candidate for normative
criticism.20 Hence, it may be true of Jay’s reproductive system that it is normatively failing. The
same cannot be said of Jay.
Admittedly there are some complex issues at work here. Although it seems clear that
Jay’s reproductive system is one in whose functions, activities, and operations, Jay is not present,
it isn’t clear that the same can be said about systems of rationality. In other words, when Jay fails
to act rationally, is that a fact about Jay the person or merely a fact about one of Jay’s bodily
20

To sharpen this distinction further, there is a difference between system-level assessment and person-level
assessment regarding the teleofunctions of one’s own systems. We might say that failure to recognize the right
reasons in any particular case is a fact about me (i.e. I failed to direct my attention in the right sort of way; hence,
person-level assessment) but we also might say that it is a fact about merely part of my cognitive systems (i.e. my
rational systems didn’t represent the right reasons; hence, system-level assessment). In any case, determining
whatever it is that warrants ascriptions of praise and blame will be a complex issue.
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systems? In my own case, when I reflect on how my own rational capacity functions, I am
present throughout the activity of recognizing and responding to the reasons that I represent.
Recognizing reasons and deliberating about them seems like something that I am doing,
something over which it at least feels like I have some control. If such introspection gives us any
indication of what’s actually going on when we employ our rational faculties (perhaps it doesn’t)
then it’s plausible that failing to act rationally is a fact about me.

5. CONCLUSION
The teleofunctional account of practical rationality attempts to explain the normativity of
rationality in a naturalistic framework. Perhaps one upshot to this view is that it dovetails nicely
with contemporary work being done in ethics on the nature of rationality. Grounding the
normativity of rationality in a teleofunction corresponds well with what ethicists call the “proper
functioning account” of rationality (Southwood 2008, 29).21 According to the proper functioning
account, rational requirements indicate what is necessary for our cognitive systems, and the
beliefs, desires, and intentions that those systems produce, to function properly. On my view, our
cognitive systems function properly when they guide us to execute only those actions that are
governed by the teleofunction of practical rationality itself. Thus, in addition to offering a
naturalistic account of the normativity of rationality, a further theoretical advantage of this view
is its compatibility with current research being done by ethicists.
I hope to have shown how teleofunctionalism can provide an interesting framework from
which to develop a satisfactory explanation of the normativity of practical rationality. The
following is a brief summary of what I have set out to do in this thesis: I began my inquiry in

21

Proponents of the proper functioning view include Michael Bratman (2009) and David Velleman (1996), among
others.
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Section 2 by gesturing at some reasons to think that the rational capacity is conducive to fitness,
although I admitted that it is ultimately an assumption of mine that rationality is an adaptation
that has a teleofunction. Next, I introduced the notion of a PR-representation and offered what I
take to be the teleofunction of the PR-representational system. Additionally, I argued that
although the rational capacity was genetically selected for, the content that fills in this capacity is
appropriately flexible and oftentimes depends on non-genetic processes. I finished this section by
explaining how rational normativity and the normativity of a biological function are related. In
Sections 2.1 and 2.2, I argued that the content of the rational capacity does not derive entirely
from genetic selection, and I explained how the PR-representational system is related to rational
action and judgments about rationality—specifically how it might fail normatively at the level of
judgment and at the level of action itself. Following these moves, I investigated the role of
objectivity in the teleofunctional account of rational normativity in Section 3. Additionally in this
section, I argued that rational normativity is intimately tied to the causal order. In Section 3.1, I
completed the project by arguing that the teleofunction of the rational capacity provides an
independent reason to obey rational requirements. In conclusion, the attractiveness of the
teleofunctionalist approach is rooted in the notion that a teleofunction provides a normative
standard by which the rationality of action is determined. If what makes it the case that an action
is rational is the fact that the action is caused in the normal way by a PR-representational system
carrying out its teleofunction, then failure to act in accord with one’s fully-functioning PRrepresentational system is the hallmark of irrationality.
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